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Abstract: We submitted three models to the competition which were based on the I-SAW 
model. The models introduced four new assumptions. In the first model an adjustment 
process was introduced through which the tendency for exploration was higher at the  
beginning and decreased over time in the exploration stage. Another new assumption was 
that surprise as a factor influencing the weight of a trial in the sampling procedure was 
added. In the second model we added the possibility of an exclusion of unreliable  
experiences gained in the early trials of a game and the possibility of a revision of a  
reasonable alternative which was responsible for a very bad outcome in the previous trial. 
Three of the four added assumptions were combined in the third model. Because each of 
our models contains at least two new assumptions, we estimated the relative effect of each 
assumption on the estimation and prediction scores and carried out a test of robustness. In 
this way, we were able to clarify the usefulness of each added assumption. 
Keywords: learning; experience; I-SAW Model; market entry game 
 
1. Introduction 
We submitted three models to the market entry prediction competition 2010. All three models are 
based on the inertia, sampling and weighting (I-SAW) model which will be explained in Section 2. In 
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Section 3 we describe the four additional assumptions we examined throughout the three models, 
which we present in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the relative effect of each added assumption. 
Lastly, in Section 6 we summarize the analysis results and the theoretical conclusions.  
2. Description of the Inertia, Sampling and Weighting (I-SAW) Model 
Both the estimation experiment and the competition experiment are modeled as a series of ܯ ൌ 40 
market entry games that are played by artificial agents. A market entry game ܩ௠ is characterized by 
different random values for its five parameters ሺ݇, ܪ, ݌ܪ, ܮ, ܵሻ. The I-SAW model [1] generates for 
each market entry game ܩ௠ a group of ܰ ൌ 4 agents that play repeatedly for ܴ ൌ 50 trials. Each agent 
݅ is characterized by five traits whose values differ between agents and are distributed uniformly with 
ߝ௜~ܷሾ0, .24], ߨ௜~ܷሾ0, .6ሿ, ߱௜~ܷሾ0, .8ሿ, ߩ௜~ܷሾ0, .2ሿ, and ߤ௜~ܷሼ1, 2, 3ሽ. All agents have the same  
action space ܣ ൌ ሼ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ, ݊݋ݐ ݁݊ݐ݁ݎሽ and each agent ݅ has to choose in each round ݐ א ܶ ൌ ሼ1, … ܴሽ an 
action ܽ௜,௧ ߳ ܣ without knowing how the other agents will decide. 
The decision process of each agent ݅ is divided into three stages: exploration, inertia, and  
exploitation. Exploration implies to enter the market with probability ݌௘௡௧௘௥ ൌ 0.66 or otherwise not 
to enter. The probability for an agent to explore is given by  
݌௜
௘௫௣௟௢௥௘ ൌ ൜
1
ߝ௜~ܷሾ0, .24ሿ
ൠ  ݂݅ ቄݐ ൌ 1
ݐ ൐ 1
ቅ 
If an agent does not explore, then she enters the second stage. Inertia implies to repeat the last  
action ܽ௜,௧ ൌ ܽ௜,௧ିଵ with probability 
݌௜
௜௡௘௥௧௜௔ ൌ ߨ௜
ௌ௨௥௣௥௜௦௘೟షభ߳ ሾߨ௜~ܷሾ0, .6ሿ,1ሿ, with  ܵݑݎ݌ݎ݅ݏ݁௧ିଵ ߳ ሾ0, 1ሿ 
All agents that have neither entered the exploration stage nor have decided in the inertia stage to  
repeat their last action, make their decision in the exploitation stage. In this stage each agent chooses 
the action ܽ௜,௧ ߳ ܣ with the highest estimated subjective value (ESV).  
Given the set of payoffs for all past cases ܺ൫ܽ௜,௣௔௦௧ ௖௔௦௘൯ ൌ ൛ݔ൫ܽ௜,ଵ൯, … , ݔ൫ܽ௜,௧ିଵ൯ൟ and the number 
of sample experiences or sample cases ߤ௜~ܷሼ1, 2, 3ሽ, the ܧܸܵof action ܽ௜,௧ for an agent ݅ is given by 
the sum of two terms: the average payoff from all past cases weighted by ߱௜~ܷሾ0, .8ሿ and the average 
payoff from the set of sample cases ሼݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ܿܽݏ݁ଵ, … , ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ܿܽݏ݁ఓ೔ሽ weighted by (1 െ ߱௜): 
ܧܸܵ൫ܽ௜,௧൯ ൌ ߱௜
∑ ݔ൫ܽ௜,௞൯௧ିଵ௞ୀଵ  
ݐ െ 1
൅ ሺ1 െ ߱௜ሻ
∑ ݔ൫ܽ௜,௦௔௠௣௟௘ ௖௔௦௘೗൯
ఓ೔
௟ୀଵ
ߤ௜
 
where the sampling procedure for any sample case ݈ is given by: ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ܿܽݏ݁௟ ൌ ݐ െ 1 with  
probability ߩ௜~ܷሾ0, .2ሿ and otherwise ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ܿܽݏ݁௟~ܷሼ1, … , ݐ െ 1ሽ. 
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3. Description of the four Additional Assumptions and the three Models 
3.1. Additional Assumption 1: The Adjustment of Exploration over Time 
In the I-SAW model, the probability to explore p୧
ୣ୶୮୪୭୰ୣ equals ε୧ if t ൐ 1. The variable ε୧ differs 
between people, but is constant within a person throughout all trials of a game. However, it seems  
reasonable to assume that when faced with an unfamiliar environment, subjects will display higher  
explorative behavior at the beginning than after gaining some experience. As indicated by machine 
learning models, the change of exploration can be linear [2-4] or discontinuous by involving a  
switching point [5]. Moreover, research on repeated choice, shows that people repeat their choices, 
i.e. develop routines, when they repeat similar decisions [6]. A routine is described as a preference for 
a specific solution to a known problem. Thus, we introduced a higher exploration level at the 
beginning of the game and a decrease of exploration with increasing numbers of trials. The decrease is 
modeled in four steps: 
݌௜
௘௫௣௟௢௥௘ ൌ ൞
1
6 כ ߝ௜/ݐ
ߝ௜
. 9 כ ߝ௜
ൢ  ݂݅ ቐ
ݐ ൌ 1
1 ൏ ݐ ൏ 6
5 ൏ ݐ ൏ 31
ݐ ൐ 30
ቑ 
Thus, the individual tendency to explore ݌௜
௘௫௣௟௢௥௘ is not only a function of the trait ߝ௜ of agent ݅ but 
also a function of the level of experience. It therefore captures additionally the adjustment process to a 
new environment. 
3.2. Additional Assumption 2: The Recalling of Surprising Experiences 
In the I-SAW model, when sampling (past) experiences, the most recent trial has a higher  
probability to be included in the sample due to the recency effect. All other past trials have the same 
probability to be sampled. However, studies concerning the von-Restorff-Effect [9] suggest that not all 
past experiences are equally likely to be included in the sample of experiences. It was found that  
stimulus items that are distinct from the general item pool are more apt to be recalled [7-9].  
Furthermore early research on animal learning and the disruptive effect of surprising events on  
memory recall, found that surprising events lead to a lower rate of recall of events subsequent to the 
surprising one [10].Therefore, we propose the influence of surprise on the sampling process in the  
exploitation stage. If the surprise term of a given trial  ܵݑݎ݌ݎ݅ݏ݁௧ିଵ exceeds a threshold of 0.85  
(according to fitted data), the probability to sample this trial for the calculation of the ESV is increased. 
To take the underweighting of rare events in decisions from experience [11,12] into consideration we  
limited this property to the last very surprising trial. Since the recency effect is assumed to vary across 
individuals, as indicated by the ߩ௜ parameter in the I-SAW model, we chose to use this parameter in 
order to depict surprise about a trial for the sampling process. Therefore, the last very surprising trial, 
has a higher probability to be sampled, and its probability to be sampled depends on the individual 
tendency to recall the most recent trial ߩ௜~ܷሾ0, 0.2ሿ.  
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3.3. Additional Assumption 3: The Possibility of an Exclusion of Very Early Trials from the Sample of 
Experiences 
As previously noted, besides the most recent trial the sampling procedure of the I-SAW model  
assigns the same probability to be recalled to all other past trials. However, in the first trials of a new 
game, strategic uncertainty and uncertainty about the payoff rule is likely to be higher. Thus, early 
choices are more prone to randomness. This led us to the assumption, that later in the game, the  
participants should be more likely to question the reliability of the information gained through the very 
early trials of the game. In order to include this “doubt about experiences in very early trials” we  
introduced the following modification: Early experiences or cases are revised and can be excluded 
from the sample even if they are drawn at first during the sampling process. Revision implies that the 
agent repeats the sampling procedure for a given sample experience or sample case ݈ if 
ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ܿܽݏ݁௟ ൏ 9 once, repeats it a second time if ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ܿܽݏ݁௟ ൏ 7, and again if 
ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ܿܽݏ݁௟ ൏ 5, and again if ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ܿܽݏ݁௟ ൏ 3. This stepwise revision of the sampling decisions 
implies that an earlier ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ܿܽݏ݁௟ is more likely excluded from the set of sample cases. 
3.4. Additional Assumption 4: The Influence of a Very Bad Experience in the Previous Trial 
 Imagine action a୧,୲ ൌ not enter has the higher ܧܸܵ in trial ݐ, but in the previous trial this choice 
led to a very bad experience. In the I-SAW model the agent would have chosen simply the action with 
the higher ESV which is “not enter”. In the I-SAW model the affective reaction caused by negative 
experiences is not captured. But decisions are not only influenced by probability, but also by affective 
information [14-16]. Thus, we introduced the assumption that the agent revises his/her choice, 
although it has a higher ESV, if he/she made a very bad experience with it in the previous trial. This 
means that agent i revises his/her action if one of the two following sets of conditions is true: 
ܨ݅ݎݏݐ, ݂݅ ݅ݐ ݅ݏ ݆݋݅݊ݐ݈ݕ ݐݎݑ݁ ݐ݄ܽݐ ൞
ݔ൫ܽ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ ݊݋ݐ ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ൯ ൏ 0
ݔ൫ܽ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ൯ ൐ 0
3 כ ൫ܽ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ ݊݋ݐ ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ൯ ൐ െݔ൫ܽ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ൯
ൢ 
ܵ݁ܿ݋݊݀, ݂݅ ݅ݐ ݅ݏ ݆݋݅݊ݐ݈ݕ ݐݎݑ݁ ݐ݄ܽݐ ൞
ݔ൫ܽ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ ݊݋ݐ ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ൯ ൐ 0
ݔ൫ܽ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ൯ ൐ 0
3 כ ൫ܽ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ ݊݋ݐ ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ൯ ൏ ݔ൫ܽ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ൯
ൢ 
Revision implies to choose a୧,୲ ൌ enter with probability λ୧~Uሾ0,0.5ሿ (a trait) and otherwise the  
action with the higher ESV a୧,୲ ൌ not enter. Note that the revision process is analogous if action 
a୧,୲ ൌ enter has the higher ܧܸܵ in trial. 
4. Description of Our Models and Their Performance in the Competition 
4.1. Teodorescu et al. (2010) 
The model of Teodorescu, Hariskos and Leder (2010) introduces two changes in the I-SAW model: 
First, the tendency for exploration is higher at the beginning and decreases over time in the exploration 
stage (3.1). Second, the last surprising trial is included with higher probability in the sampling of past 
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cases in the exploitation stage (3.2). One of the main advantages of these suggested changes to the  
I-SAW model is that although it takes into account the changes of exploration over time and the effect 
of surprise on memory processes, it does not add any other traits than the ones estimated by the  
original I-SAW model. 
4.2. Hariskos et al. (2010) 
The model of Hariskos, Leder and Teodorescu (2010) introduces two changes to the exploitation 
stage of the I-SAW model: First, very early trials are excluded with higher probability from the sample 
of experiences (3.3). Second, the affective reaction caused by negative experiences was addressed (3.4). 
4.3. Leder et al. (2010) 
After simulating the first two models, we created a third model in which we integrated the  
decreasing tendency to explore with increasing numbers of trials (additional assumption 3.1), the doubt 
about the reliability of experiences in very early trials (additional assumption 3.2), and the revision of a 
reasonable alternative given an associated very bad experience in the previous trial (additional  
assumption 3.4). We kept all parameters other than a slight change in the function determining the  
tendency to explore as depicted below: 
݌௜
௘௫௣௟௢௥௘ ൌ ൞
1
9 כ ߝ௜/ݐ
0.95 כ ߝ௜
0.9 כ ߝ௜
ൢ  ݂݅ ቐ
ݐ ൌ 1
1 ൏ ݐ ൏ 10
9 ൏ ݐ ൏ 31
ݐ ൐ 30
ቑ 
4.4. The Models’ Performance 
Table 1 summarizes the performance of our three models relative to the I-SAW model, once for the 
data of the estimation set, and once for the data of the competition set. We used the Mean Squared 
Distance (MSD) criterion as a performance’s measure (as was used in the competition). Specifically, 
MSD is the average squared distance between the prediction and the observed choice proportion 
(lower is better). 
All three models yield a better fit for the data from the estimation set than the I-SAW model. The fit 
of the first model (3.1) was slightly better than the I-SAW model, and the fit of the other two models 
(3.2 and 3.3) were by far better. However, only the first model predicted the competition data set better 
than the I-SAW model. In the following section we will focus on this issue. 
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Table 1. The performance of our models relative to the baseline model. 
 Estimation 
MSD Score 
Relative 
Effect 
Competition 
MSD Score 
Relative 
Effect 
I-SAW Model (2) 1.38  1.1749  
Teodorescu et al. (4.1) 1.3507 –2.12% 1.16 –1.27% 
Hariskos et al. (4.2) 1.1546 –16.33% 1.2197 3.81% 
Leder et al. (4.3) 1.1546 –16.07% 1.1932 1.56% 
5. The Predictive Power of Each Additional Assumption 
Because we added more than one assumption to the I-SAW model in each of our models, we cannot 
state the relative effect of each assumption individually. For this reason, we calculated the MSD scores 
after the competition by adding only one assumption to the I-SAW model (10,000 simulations) and 
summarized the relative effect of each assumption. The relative effect for the estimation and  
competition score is depicted in Table 2.  
Table 2. The relative effect of each assumption on the estimation and competition score. 
 Estimation 
MSD Score 
Relative 
Effect 
Competition 
MSD Score 
Relative 
Effect 
I-SAW Model (2) 1.38  1.1749  
Exploration Over Time (3.1) 1.3485 –2.28% 1.1738 –0.09% 
Surprising Experiences (3.2) 1.3496 –2.20% 1.1617 –1.12% 
Very Early Trials (3.3) 1.2791 –7.31% 1.1375 –3.18% 
Bad Experience in the Previous Trial (3.4) 1.2312 –10.78% 1.2486 6.27% 
As depicted, each of our additional assumptions improved the estimation score. The first three  
assumptions (3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) also improved the competition score. Whereas the fourth  
assumption (3.4), while leading to the largest improvement for the estimation set, impaired the  
competition score, this clearly indicates over-fitting. Thus, we can conclude that the additional fourth 
assumption is responsible for the poor predictive performance of our second and third models. 
In order to examine whether the very small improvement that resulted from adding the first  
assumption (3.1) was not obtained by chance, we conducted an additional analysis. One simple  
prediction of the decreasing exploration assumption is that in problems in which the best reply is  
relatively stable across trials, best reply behaviors are expected to become more common as time  
advances. On the other hand, constant exploration rate, as assumed by the original I-SAW model,  
predicts that in these cases, the frequency of best reply behaviors will remain constant over all trials. 
Problems 3 and 8 satisfy the relatively stable best reply requirement, since in these problems about 
95% of the experiences yielded better payoffs for entering than staying out (obtained greater than  
forgone payoffs for entering and vice versa for staying out). The following table shows the percentages 
of best reply behaviors to previous trials for the first 12 trials: 
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Table 3. Percentage of best reply behavior to previous trials for trial 1–12. 
Trial Percentage of best reply behavior to previous trials 
2 75.0% 
4 73.3% 
6 86.7% 
8 86.7% 
10 91.7% 
12 90.0% 
Table 3 shows that the frequency of best reply behaviors increases with increasing numbers of  
trials, a result that cannot be explained by the original stable exploration assumption of the I-SAW 
model. Rather, these results can be captured by the assumption that the tendency to explore is higher in 
the first trials and decreases throughout the trials. Further support to the robustness of the decreasing 
exploration assumption can be found in the results of the following problem presented by Hochman 
and Erev (2007) [17]. In an experiment using the clicking paradigm, subjects were asked to choose 
repeatedly between unlabeled keys on the computer screen. Pressing on one of the keys always  
resulted in a payoff of eight points and the other always resulted in a payoff of nine. As in the market 
entry game, after each trial subjects received information about the forgone payoff, in addition to their 
obtained payoff. The surprising result was that the proportion of choosing the clearly better option  
increased gradually during the first 10 trials before reaching 90%–100% in later trials (see Figure 4  
in [17]). Therefore, it seems that decreasing exploration over time is a robust phenomenon, even when  
collecting information actively is not needed and counterproductive.  
6. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined four additional assumptions to the I-SAW model [1]. The first  
assumption implies that the tendency for exploration is higher at the beginning and decreases over time 
in the exploration stage. Although it improved the predictions only slightly, we showed that this  
assumption appears to be robust, even beyond market entry games. The second assumption suggests 
that the last surprising trial needs to be included with higher probability in the sampling of past cases 
in the exploitation stage. This minor change consistently improved the predictions slightly, and is in 
line with the von-Restorff-Effect [7-9] as well as with animal research on the disruptive effect of  
surprising events on memory recall [10]. In the third additional assumption, we proposed that very  
early trials are excluded with higher probability from the sample of experiences. We suggested that 
this can be a result of “doubt about experiences in very early trials”, though one can argue that it might 
result also from memory limitation. It is important to note, that this additional assumption yields a high 
relative effect in the competition and the estimation set, thus, we believe that future research should 
address its importance and its underling processes. The fourth assumption implies the revision of a  
reasonable alternative given an associated very bad experience in the previous trial. However, we did 
not find evidence to support this assumption; therefore, we concluded that the large improvement of 
the predictions for the estimated data set was the result of over fitting. We believe that the first three 
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assumptions presented here address robust learning processes and are not only specific for market 
entry games. Future research is needed to determine the robustness and limitations of the above  
additional assumptions.  
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